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Pan-Germanism. By ROLAND G. USHER. (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1913. Pp. 314.)

Dr. Usher's volume reads like a romance. Tiresome details are omitted, the policies of nations are sketched in large and bold characters and the reader is carried on from plot to counter-plot to a grand finale in which he feels a sensible disappointment when told that the ambitious and masterly plans of the villain of the piece can, as conditions stand, meet at best with only "a temporary or partial success." Diplomacy has always been popularly regarded as a peculiarly exciting career, and no one can thread his way through the maze of conflicting policies presented in *Pan-Germanism* without feeling a keen desire to have a hand in the game.

The opening chapter sets forth the causes of foreign aggression. To Germany expansion is a necessary condition of national self-preservation. Emigration as an alternative method of reducing the pressure of population is wholly unacceptable, since Germany would thereby remain static in population and wealth, while England, France and Russia, each possessing colonies, would continue to expand. Thus, while Pan-Germanism is a defensive movement to relieve Germany of the pressure of France and Russia, it is an offensive movement to obtain control of territory and markets held by England.

Subsequent chapters explain the German view of England, France and Russia. Both England and France are inefficiently governed and their control over their colonies is insecure; while Russia is at once badly governed, bankrupt in finance and weak in internal cohesion. On the other hand, Germany is confident of her own strength. Economically, she is self-sufficing and a creditor nation; her government is admittedly efficient and her army and navy are kept in a constant state of preparedness for war. It is true that England and France take a different view of the situation; they are the centers of the world's credit and exchange system and can thus control, to a large extent, the available money resources of the world at any given moment; they realize that Germany is conducting its great industrial business largely upon borrowed money. On the other hand, Germany believes that the economic strength of England and France is dependent upon the preservation of peace, and that if Germany were victorious there would be nothing to prevent her from repudiating her debts, the morality of such a procedure being controlled by the necessity of the situation.

To accomplish her purpose Germany must have a great army and a great navy at her command; she must seize Belgium and Holland, and

ultimately Norway, Sweden and Denmark; she must win, as her allies, Austria, Italy, the Balkans and Turkey, and to effect this alliance she must be ready to divide the spoils. In the chapters entitled "First Steps" and "First Defeats" the author describes the progress made by Germany towards the accomplishment of her purpose and the reverses she has met with. Her policies in Africa, Venezuela, Turkey, Morocco and Persia are briefly summarized. The Tripolitan war, which brought Italy back to the Triple Alliance, furthered the cause of Pan-Germanism, but this success was more than offset by the Balkan war, the result of which was to range the Balkan states on the side of the Triple Entente.

But while the reader cannot help but be charmed by the clearness of style and the bold positive exposition of policies which characterizes Dr. Usher's book, he will, doubtless, stop abruptly in the course of many a paragraph and wonder upon what evidence the author can make such categorical statements concerning Germany's plan of world domination. The author protects himself, it is true, by stating that he is merely voicing the German view of the international situation; but while it is not to be denied that there are certain Germans who do hold this view, the important question is how far it is held by the great body of the German people. On page 20, note, the author appears to suggest that Pan-Germanism is the policy of a "great nation of intellectual people," yet on page 267 he clearly shows that Germany is by no means a unit in its foreign policy, and that there is a large body of "irreconcilables" who are radically opposed to Pan-Germanism. In the same way, the attitude of the United States towards the European alliances, as described in chapter X, is certainly not that of the political party in power at present, nor that of the great body of the people, who would be much surprised to learn that they have an "ambition to play a part in the politics of the world" (page 144), and that they are to be the "offensive arm of the Triple Entente (page 156)." The chapter in which the justifiability of Pan-Germanism is argued, presumably from the German point of view, to the overthrow of all accepted standards of morality, is nothing less than amazing.

On the whole, while *Pan-Germanism* must be pronounced a very clever and entertaining book, there is so little scientific evidence furnished to support its premises that its conclusions are necessarily somewhat vague and unsatisfactory. But, while the reader may quarrel with Dr. Usher's dogmatic manner and with many of his sweeping assertions, he will, at the same time, frankly confess that he has never read a more fascinating introduction to the study of present European diplomacy.

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